STEPHEN COX examines The Art of Fiction, a book of newly published selections from Ayn Rand's lectures on fiction-writing that extend and complicate our knowledge of her literary ideas. Her discussion of the fiction-writer's craft provides interesting and sometimes provocative views on general problems of literary form and method.

Posthumous publication of Ayn Rand's novella Ideal and her play The Unconquered provides an opportunity to assess her early work. The Unconquered is an unfortunate theatrical dramatization of her novel We the Living. Ideal, which was written first as a novella and then as a play, is the inadequate presentation of a provocative idea. Editorial packaging of The Unconquered is extensive and informative; of Ideal, slight and confused. Especially regrettable is the theory of genres presented in place of editorial commentary (...) on Ideal. (shrink)

This response to Roderick T. Long's defense of anarchism attempts to show that the ethical and the practical arguments for anarchism do not converge; that anarchism satisfies neither Ayn Rand's demand for objective justice nor Isabel Paterson's demand for structured checks on the abuse of power; that the chief economic argument for the practicality of anarchism, the argument from competition, is contrary to basic economic principles; and that crucial anarchist claims defy ordinary and defensible notions of justice, usefulness, and reasonableness. (...) Also attempted is an identification of the legitimately coercive economic function of government. (shrink)

THE TAIN OF THE MIRROR: DERRIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION by Rodolphe Gasché Cambridge: Hanard University Press, 1986. 356 pp., $25.00, $12.95 (paper) DERRIDA ON THE THRESHOLD OF SENSE by John Llewelyn New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 137 pp., $27.50, $10.95 (paper).

Stephen Yablo offers a solution to the problem of mental causation by claiming that the physical is a determinate of the mental's determinable, and therefore the mental and physical do not compete for causal relevance. I present Yablo's solution and argue that the mental‐physical relation cannot meet three necessary conditions for determination. That relation fails to meet the requirements that determinates of the same determinable be incompatible and that no property can be a determinate of more than one determinable. (...) Further, the mental and physical do not fall under the same series of scope inclusions as determinables and their determinates must. Yablo's conception of determination might be rendered more general to avoid these objections, but doing so would prevent it from functioning as a competitor to extant theories of the mental‐physical relation. Thus, Yablo's solution to the problem of mental causation cannot be both adequately specific and correct. (shrink)

Tench Coxe, a member of the second rank of this nation's Founders and a leading proponent of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, wrote prolifically about the right to keep and bear arms. In this Article, the authors trace Coxe's story, from his early writings in support of the Constitution, through his years of public service, to his political writings in opposition to the presidential campaigns of John Adams and John Quincy Adams. The authors note that Coxe described the (...) Second Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right, and believed that an individual right to bear arms was necessary for self-defense and hunting, as well as for militia purposes and protection against oppression by large standing armies. The views of this important Founding Era political commentator and public servant inform the ongoing Second Amendment debate. The authors argue that Coxe's depiction of an individual right to bear arms encompassing hunting, self-defense, and the public militia power supports the "Standard Model" of the Second Amendment prevalent in the legal literature. This Article also discusses Coxe's important role as an economic scholar in early America, and in the creation of the protectionist system of the early Republic, as both an journalistic advocate and as an executive branch official. One of his executive branch positions involved heading the federal government program to give guns to militiamen who could not afford their own. (shrink)

Stephen Yablo offers a solution to the problem of mental causation by claiming that the physical is a determinate of the mental's determinable, and therefore the mental and physical do not compete for causal relevance. I present Yablo's solution and argue that the mental‐physical relation cannot meet three necessary conditions for determination. That relation fails to meet the requirements that determinates of the same determinable be incompatible and that no property can be a determinate of more than one determinable. (...) Further, the mental and physical do not fall under the same series of scope inclusions as determinables and their determinates must. Yablo's conception of determination might be rendered more general to avoid these objections, but doing so would prevent it from functioning as a competitor to extant theories of the mental‐physical relation. Thus, Yablo's solution to the problem of mental causation cannot be both adequately specific and correct. (shrink)

In his essay “Rand, Paterson, and the Problem of Anarchism,” which appeared in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (July 2013), Stephen Cox argues that the principles of consent and non-initiation of force on which anarchists rely are too strong, and would require undue violation of the principle of non-sacrifice unless modified. But properly interpreted, these principles do not generate the conflicts that Cox describes, and such modifications as are defensible still do not rule out anarchism; hence Cox's case (...) against anarchism fails. (shrink)

As Nair-Collins and Joffe note, the concern that our tests for brain death do not successfully show that all brain functions have stopped is not new (Nair-Collins and Joffe 2023). As our abilities...

Jecker, et al., argue against rejecting a location for an international bioethics conference based on a “litmus test” for several reasons, ranging from the practical to the theoretical. However, th...

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to save tens of thousands of lives, but legal and social barriers may delay or even deter manufacturers from offering fully automated vehicles and thereby cost lives that otherwise could be saved. Moral philosophers use “thought experiments” to teach us about what ethics might say about the ethical behavior of AVs. If a manufacturer designing an AV decided to make what it believes is an ethical choice to save a large group of lives by steering (...) away from the large group towards a single individual, could the manufacturer be liable to that single individual? I believe the answer is yes. This article discusses famous “trolley problem” thought experiments in moral philosophy, which news articles have recently applied to AVs. After establishing a hypothetical case, applying product liability law to AV behavior may show a way, in some jurisdictions, that will permit a manufacturer to implement an ethical choice without triggering liability, but liability risk remains. I then turn to possible traditional defenses to see if they prevent liability for a manufacturer making what it believes is an ethical design choice—necessity, defense of self, and the sudden emergency doctrine. None of them provides an effective defense. Under current law, maximizing collision avoidance appears to minimize legal risk. I conclude that the only way to provide effective protection to a manufacturer seeking to implement ethical choices about AV behavior is through special legislation or regulation. (shrink)

William James argued for a philosophy of democracy and pluralism that advocates individual and collective responsibility for our social arrangements, our morality, and our religion. In James' view, democracy resides first and foremost not in governmental institutions or in procedures such as voting, but rather in the characteristics of individuals, and in qualities of mind and conduct. It is a philosophy for social change, counselling action and hope despite the manifold challenges facing democratic politics, and these issues still resonate strongly (...) today. In this book, Stephen Bush explores how these themes connect to James' philosophy of religion, his moral thought, his epistemology, his psychology, and his metaphysics. His fresh and original study highlights the relevance of James' thought to modern debates, and will appeal to scholars and students of moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Winner of the Gustave O. Arlt Award in the HumanitiesThree understandings of the nature of religion--religion as experience, symbolic meaning, and power--have dominated scholarly discussions, in succession, for the past hundred years. Proponents of each of these three approaches have tended to downplay, ignore, or actively criticize the others. But why should the three approaches be at odds? Religion as it is practiced involves experiences, meanings, and power, so students of religion should attend to all three. Furthermore, theorists of religion (...) should have an account that carefully conceptualizes all three aspects, without regarding any of them as more basic than the others.Visions of Religion provides just such an account. Stephen S. Bush examines influential proponents of the three visions, arguing that each approach offers substantial and lasting contributions to the study of religion, although each requires revision.Bush rehabilitates the concepts of experience and meaning, two categories that are much maligned these days. In doing so, he shows the extent to which these categories are implicated in matters of social power. As for power, the book argues that the analysis of power requires attention to meaning and experience.Visions of Religion accomplishes all this by articulating a social practical theory of religion that can account for all three aspects, even as it incorporates them into a single theoretical framework. (shrink)

I agree fully that a “clearer picture of how vulnerability might manifest and how it can be accommodated, ideally without resorting to mere exclusion from research, is needed” (Friesen et al. 2023,...

Despite considerable interest in viral evolution, at least among virologists, viruses are rarely considered from the same evolutionary vantage point as other organisms. Early work of necessity emphasized phenotype and phenotypic variation (and therefore arguably was more oriented towards the broader biological and ecological perspectives). More recent work (essentially since the development of molecular evolution in the 1960's but beginning earlier) has concentrated on genotypic variation, with less clarity about the significance of such variations. Other aspects of evolutionary theory, especially (...) considerations of natural selection and of evolutionary constraints, have not widely been applied to viruses, and an evolutionary framework for virology has long been lacking. This becomes apparent in considering 'emerging' viruses, which have often been treated on an ad hoc basis. It was often felt that, because previously unrecognized viruses are involved, mechanisms of viral emergence must mirror the unpredictability of mutations in the viral genome. However, most examples of viral emergence are independent of mutation, at least initially, and are often pre-existing viruses in changed circumstances ('viral traffic'). This conclusion also readily follows from ordinary Darwinian premises, which would require that, like other living species, 'new' organisms are descended only from existing species. In this respect, from a Darwinian perspective, viruses would appear to resemble other organisms. (shrink)

William James is famous for his investigations of the “Varieties of Religious Experience” in which people encounter (what they take to be) the divine. But in his essay, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” his interest is in our experiences, not of anything purportedly supernatural, but of one another. He thinks we need to cultivate the capacity to apprehend the intrinsic value of others, even and especially of strangers. We do so in experiences of the wonder and beauty of (...) our fellow citizens, and of our harmony with them. Democratic societies require a sense of attraction to one another’s form of life if they are to inspire shared commitments to public goods. Whereas we shouldn’t reject the political significance of aversion, contestation, and dissonance, these negative attitudes do not suffice. Sustaining democratic engagement requires attractive attitudes, and among these are the wonder, beauty, and harmony that James promotes. (shrink)

An anxious resident paged ethics at 2:00 a.m. His patient, Mr. M, a twenty‐nine‐year‐old man with a history of multiple substance abuse, was in the hospital after cardiac arrest and lack of cerebral perfusion. Sadly, the young man probably met the criteria for brain death, but the final apnea test to confirm the diagnosis could not be done for another forty‐eight to seventy‐two hours because the Klonopin in his system might confound the results. The resident's concern, however, addressed a request (...) made by the patient's mother for a sperm harvest. The patient's mother maintained that her son had said he wanted to give her grandchildren. She wished to harvest sperm from him for a future use with an as‐yet‐to‐be‐determined surrogate mother. (shrink)

This article presents a computational model of the learning of diagnostic knowledge, based on observations of human operators engaged in real-world troubleshooting tasks. We present a model of problem solving and learning in which the reasoner introspects about its own performance on the problem-solving task, identifies what it needs to learn to improve its performance, formulates learning goals to acquire the required knowledge, and pursues its learning goals using multiple learning strategies. The model is implemented in a computer system which (...) provides a case study based on observations of troubleshooting operators and protocol analysis of the data gathered in the test area of an operational electronics manufacturing plant. The model not only addresses issues in human learning, but, in addition, is computationally justified as a uniform, extensible framework for multistrategy learning. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and criticize two highly influential anti-skeptical proposals inspired by Wittgenstein’s (1969) remarks on ‘hinges’, namely Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment strategy’ (2012, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Moyal-Sharrock ‘non epistemic strategy’ (2004,2005). I argue that both these proposals fail to represent a valid response to skeptical worries. Furthermore, I argue that following Wittgenstein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combination (...) of signs excluded from our epistemic practices. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTeam physicians have a complicated job that involves potentially conflicting obligations to multiple entities. Though responsible for the medical care of the athletes as individuals, they also have obligations to the team that employs them which can include returning athletes to play who are at heightened risk of re-injury. The fact that the athletes and owners have some overlapping interests only complicates this issue. Further, there are strong financial incentives to do what is necessary to obtain and keep a position (...) as a team physician. This article examines dual loyalty and conflict of interest in sports medicine, and argues that there is not now a widely accepted or adequate solution to either. Moving toward a solution will require fairly serious changes in the role of the team physician.Abbreviations: FIMS International Federation of Sports Medicine; NFL National Football League; MVP Most Valuable Player; RGIII Robert Griffin, III. (shrink)

Makins’s analysis of the philosophical justification of decision-making understates and so misinterprets the importance of patient values to ‘the deference principle.’ (Makins N,1, p1) He assesses autonomy and beneficence as two separate arguments in support of deferring to patient preferences, but they only work well considered together. Further, neither the constitutive nor the evidential view of beneficence fully recognises the importance of patient values to understanding the patient’s worldview, which in turn determines what risks and benefits matter most. Revising these (...) arguments enables a much fuller understanding of the importance of patient values to the practice of medicine, which will in turn improve the refinement of the deference principle. Autonomy requires beneficence, and vice versa, for either of them to be sufficient arguments for deferring to patient choices. Focusing on autonomy alone to justify deference overstates the value of choice in and of itself, as good medicine does not pursue just any choices. It seeks informed consent, which means that the choices we truly value are those made while understanding what is importantly relevant to the choice. A well-informed decision includes data about expected side effects and likelihood of beneficial effects; but it also includes knowing the patient’s values and goals. One must know what is actually valuable …. (shrink)

[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces (...) of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second. (shrink)

presents a puzzle as to whether Aristotle views morally virtuous activity as happiness, as book 1 seems to indicate, or philosophical contemplation as happiness, as book 10 seems to indicate. The most influential attempts to resolve this issue have been either monistic or inclusivist. According to the monists, happiness consists exclusively of contemplation. According to the inclusivists, contemplation is one constituent of happiness, but morally virtuous activity is another. In this essay I will examine influential defenses of monism. Finding these (...) accounts superior to inclusivism, but still deficient, I will present and defend a dualistic account of happiness in which two different types of happiness, one divine and one human, are present in Nicomachean Ethics. When Aristotle commends contemplation as a happiness that humans can attain, he is careful to specify that this activity corresponds to a capacity (nous) that is not, properly speaking, human, even though humans can exercise it. Contemplation, the divine good, is the highest good that humans can obtain, but it is not the characteristic human good. The characteristic human good corresponds to the specifically and merely human function, which is an activity of the compound of human reason and emotions. (shrink)

Although the overwhelming majority of terminally ill patients in Oregon who seek a physician's aid in dying are enrolled in hospice programs, hospices do not take a major role in this practice. An examination of fifty‐five Oregon hospices reveals that both legal and moral questions prevent hospices from collaborating fully with physician‐assisted death.

A compelling investigation into one of the most coveted and cherished ideals, "Wisdom" also chronicles the efforts of modern science to penetrate the mysterious nature of this timeless virtue.

The development of a code of ethics for a profession can be an indicator of the coherence and stability of a discipline as a unique and singular entity. Since “bioethics”, as a discipline, is not one profession but many, practiced by persons with not one but many varying responsibilities and training, it has been argued that no code of ethics is possible for the discipline(s) of bioethics. I argue that a code of ethics is possible for bioethics by looking at (...) the nature of the various disciplines and noting necessary overlap between them, and deriving the ethics from the nature of the discipline(s) themselves. I show how this can be done by arguing that strict rules about funding and conflict of interest are necessary for bioethicists. (shrink)

In this reply to Kent Brintnall's response to my essay on Georges Bataille and the ethics of ecstasy, I explore two primary questions: whether instrumentalization is inherently violent and non-instrumentalization is inherently non-violent, and whether there is a way to intervene in the world that avoids both “apathetic disengagement” and domination. I endorse the view that instrumentalization can be good as well as bad, and I suggest that it is possible to strive to intervene in the world without striving to (...) master it. I make reference to Sarah Coakley as a Christian theologian who advances particular practices that aim for non-dominating intervention in theworld. (shrink)

The constructivist position, that mystical experiences are determined by the experiencer's cultural context, is now more prevalent among scholars of religion than the perennialist position, which maintains that mystical experiences have a common core that is cross-culturally universal. In large part, this is due to the efforts of Wayne Proudfoot in his widely accepted book, Religious Experience.In this article, I identify some significant unresolved issues in Proudfoot's defence of constructivism. My aim is not to defend perennialism, but to specify some (...) objections to the constructivist thesis that constructivists need to address more adequately. (shrink)